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EVIDENCE
I. INFORMER PRIVILEGE
In State v. Batson,I the defendant, appealing his conviction
for the sale of LSD, presented the South Carolina Supreme Court
with an issue of first impresion-the informer privilege.
Defendant Batson and his companion McCrae were ap-
proached by two female SLED informers attempting to purchase
narcotics. After McCrae agreed to a sale, one of the girls tele-
phoned Gilreath, an undercover SLED agent who later arrived
with another, but unidentified, SLED agent, and according to the
defendant, an unidentified third girl accompanied them. At
McCrae's direction, the group drove to a location where narcotics
were collected and later returned to McCrae's beach house where
both money and tablets were counted. Before finalizing the sale,
the two girls were returned to their motel. The actual sale was
concluded in Gilreath's car a short distance away, at which time
Batson and McCrae were arrested.
McCrae, who admitted his guilt in a prior juvenile court
proceeding, and Batson testified that Batson's attention during
the negotiations had been directed t6ward one of the girls. In fact,
both were said to have been outside the room in which McCrae
and Gilreath were counting tablets and money and thus absent
from a significant portion of the narcotics transactions. Gilreath
testified, however, that Batson had "fully participated" in the
commission of the crime. Upon cross-examination of Gilreath,
Batson's attorney attempted to elicit the identity of the two fe-
male informers, the other male SLED agent and the unidentified
girl. The solicitor objected on the ground that the identity of the
undercover agents was priviledged information which the State
was not required to disclose. Gilreath told the court that the two
girls were not commissioned agents but were "just informers,"
whose last names he did not know. He did say, however, that he
was willing to divulge the other male SLED agent's identity but
denied the unidentified girl's existence. The trial court ruled that
Gilreath could not be required to disclose the identity of the two
female informers beyond their first names which were already
known.
The common law, based upon the public policy of protecting
1. 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973).
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the flow of information necessary to aid effective law enforce-
ment, allowed the prosecution to withhold from the accused the
identity of an informer in a criminal case. 2 In Roviaro v. United
States, 3 a leading case on the informer privilege, the United
States Supreme Court said:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is
justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the pub-
lic interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper bal-
ance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the par-
ticular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of
the informer's testimony and other relevant factors.4
Other courts, espousing a test that balances both the public's and
a defendant's interests, have chosen a more mechanical rule that
requires no disclosure of one who is merely an informer and not a
participant or material witness.
5
There seems to be general agreement that an accused has the
burden of showing facts and circumstances to justify an exception
to the informer privilege.' With considerable discretion vested in
the trial judge, refusals to disclose an informer's identity must be
proven to have resulted in prejudice to the defendant. 7 There
remains substantial disagreement on two issues: when a motion
for disclosure is made timely and when an informer's status as
2. See generally PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 510, Advisory Committee's Note, Subdivi-
sion (c)2; J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 26 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as DREHER].
3. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
4. Id. at 62.
5. Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gibbs, 435
F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1970); Jimenez v. United States, 397 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1968).
6. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Lannom v. United States,
381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968); State v. Dotson, 260 La.
471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1972); Centoamore v. Nebraska, 105 Neb. 452, 181 N.W. 182 (1920);
Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973).
The extent of that burden varies among the jurisdictions, but, because of the state's
inherent information gathering advantages, if there is to be any imbalance in discovery
rights, it should work in the defendant's favor. See Note, Prosecutorial Discovery under
Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1018-19 (1972). In Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1970), the court noted that in light of the difficult
problems confronting defendants-an unawareness of the information capable of being
supplied by informers, defendants need only present some evidence of the possibility that
an unnamed informer is a material witness.
7. See note 6 supra.
1974]
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either a participant or a material witness or both requires disclo-
sure.'
The Batson court, although it recognized the need for the
informer privilege subject to certain limitations, avoided that
issue through the adoption of this timely request rule:
[A] request to be timely should be made prior to the com-
mencement of the trial where as here all of the facts other than
the identities were known to the accused, he was represented by
retained counsel and there was abundant time in which to make
the request prior to trial.'
In addition, the court observed that the record indicated the de-
fendant had no reason to believe that testimony of any of the
female informers would benefit his defense and that informer
identity had been raised as a matter of trial strategy. The court
ultimately employed South Carolina's system of rotating circuit
judges presiding over limited terms of court as a final justification
8. United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1966) (no disclosure where informer
absent from negotiations between officer and defendant after arranging meeting). But see
United States ex rel. Drew v. Meyers, 327 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
847 (1968) (disclosure required where informer contacted defendant and was only ten feet
from where transaction occurred); People v. Patejdl, 35 Cal. App. 3d 936, 111 Cal. Rptr.
(1973) (disclosure required where conflict exists between defendant's and informer's testi-
mony, and informer's testimony is the primary evidence on the issue of guilt); Common-
wealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973) (disclosure required when
informant was at least an active participant in the events leading up to the illegal transac-
tion if not an eye witness).
9. 261 S.C. at 136, 198 S.E.2d at 521. Discussion of the issue of the informer privilege
and its exceptions is not totally absent from the opinion. The Batson court discussed the
issue of what constitutes a bona fide request in such terms that perhaps there are now
guidelines as to which circumstances will justify an exception to the informer privilege in
South Carolina. Both the appellant and State phrased the issue in terms of whether
disclosure was required when the informer had been a material witness and an active
participant. Brief for Appellant at 8; Brief for State at 6. The State argued that Roviaro
required disclosure of an informer who was the sole participant other than the accused in
the alleged offense. Brief for Appellant at 8. Since the State argued the sole participant
theory and the court noted that Roviaro involved that particular theory, there may now
be dicta pointing to disclosure when the informer is the sole participant other than the
accused.
If the court is moving toward this position, an "all or nothing" proposition, a distinc-
tion should be made between informers of the "finger-pointing" variety and those shown
by the defendant to be potential participating and non-participating eyewitnesses capable
of vindicating the innocence of the accused or lessening the risk of false testimony. People
v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).
But even in the situation where the informer merely supplies information his identity
may be crucial when the legality of a search is in issue and communications of the informer
are utilized to establish probable cause. The State is required to disclose informer identity
unless there is sufficient evidence apart from his communication to justify the search.
Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
3
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for a rigid pretrial request for disclosure rule."0 One must place
the rotation system remarks in context. Certainly the court, by
requiring a pretrail request, was not attempting to have requests
for disclosure and the ultimate trial handled by the same judge
since the system presented in Batson does not ensure that result.
Instead, the Batson court was attempting to avoid requests (some
perhaps quite legitimate-justifying grants of continuance)
which come so late in the term that they preclude full trial during
the term by the same judge."
Other courts have required a "reasonable" request for disclo-
sure, but they have not found it necessary to go so far as to adopt
the strict Batson-type pretrial request rule.12 Although recogniz-
ing that proper preliminary hearings on pretrial motions can
avoid trial delays due to grants of continuance, California courts
have held that a request for disclosure must be made either prior
to or at the time of trial and only the failure to make such a
request prior to an appellate proceeding waives any rights to dis-
closure. 13
In Commonwealth v. Pritchett,4 the State had argued that
the criminal procedure rules required that requests for disclosure
10. 261 S.C. at 136, 198 S.E.2d at 521. The author has been unsuccessful in attempts
at locating other jurisdictions employing a rotation system with fixed court terms, which
also justifies a rigid pretrial request rule by its rotation system.
If the rotation system has some claim to being "an adequate state ground," in Henry
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), the Court held that it would deny certiorari or dismiss
an appeal if the state court judgment could be supported entirely on "an adequate and
independent state ground." In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), the Court held
that a state court might refuse review if the litigant failed to comply with a state proce-
dural rule which was reasonable, fair and essential to an orderly process of litigation. But,
if the procedural rule denied him of a fair opportunity to raise a federal question in the
state proceeding, Supreme Court review was not precluded. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). In Batson the court's timely
request rule denied the defendant an opportunity to raise the issue of whether the defen-
dant's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial could be secured without disclosure of
informer identities.
11. Of course, Batson can be read as an "under the circumstances" opinion consistent
with a request rule which condones a trial request for disclosure where the need for such
disclosure arises only after trial has begun. See State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476
(1957).
12. People v. Gorg, 157 Cal. App. 2d 395, 321 P.2d 143 (1958); People v. Johnson, 157
Cal. App. 2d 555, 321 P.2d 35 (1958); People v. Lundy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 244, 311 P.2d
601 (1957); State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957); State v. Moore, 3 N.C. App.
286, 164 S.E.2d 620 (1957); Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434
(1973).
13. Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958); People v. Gorg, 157
Cal. App. 2d 395, 321 P.2d 143 (1958).
14. 225 Pa. Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973).
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be made at trial rather than at a preliminary hearing. The court
found no such requirement and even if required by the rules,
defendant had presented circumstances justifying an exception,
i.e., fundamental conflicts in testimony and a pronounced need
for disclosure to present an entrapment defense. Pritchett, how-
ever, is not strong support for a mandatory pretrial request rule
since the opinion did not preclude the request at trial from being
timely.
North Carolina has followed the Roviaro or no-fixed-rule
approach and found that "the propriety of disclosing the identity
of an informer must depend on the circumstances of the case and
at what stage of the proceeding the request is made."1 In State
v. Boles, 17 in the course of North Carolina's presentation of a
charge of unlawful sale of liquor, the request of defendant for
informer disclosure was refused. Later, during presentation of the
defense's case, the defendant testified that she was not at home
at the time of the sale-thereby calling the State's evidence of her
participation into question and suggesting unavoidable conflicts
in testimony. The North Carolina Supreme Court said:
Had the defendant, in the light of this conflict, requested
the name of the confidential informer as a possible defense wit-
ness, a more serious question would have been presented. 8
There is a degree of conflict in the Batson testimony, on the issue
of the extent of the defendant's participation, if any, in the nar-
cotics transaction that may well have merited both a flexible
timely request rule and an exception to the privilege. The conflict
in the testimony of Gilreath, Batson and McCrae, a conflict only
discoverable at trial, emphasizes the need for a more flexible
request rule. Even the Batson court recognized this need when it
said:
[A] situation might very well arise when an accused would not
15. PA. R. CrM. PRO. 310.
16. State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 85, 97 S.E.2d at 477. See also People v. Patejdl, 35 Cal. App. 3d 936, 111
Cal. Rptr. 191 (1973) (conflict between defendant's and informer's testimony; informer's
testimony was primary evidence on issue of guilt); People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 434
P.2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967) (testimony of informer might have bearing on defen-
dant's claim that he was a mere visitor in apartment where narcotics were found); Acosta
v. State, 403 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Crim. 1966) (disclosure necessary when informer had taken
material part in bringing about commission of crime and might be material witness as to
whether accused knowingly committed the criminal act).
[Vol. 26
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know until during trial that knowledge of the identity of an
informer-witness might be beneficial or helpful. 9
The Batson timely request rule, in its strict form, may in the
general context of pretrial discovery, create fourteenth amend-
ment due process problems. The United States Supreme Court
in Wardius v. Oregon" held that reciprocal discovery is constitu-
tionally required for an alibi rule to be valid. The state statute
precluded the introduction of alibi evidence without notice to the
State of an alibi defense prior to trial, but no provision for recipro-
cal discovery by the defendant was included.2' The Court noted:
It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the
details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him
to the hazards of surprise concerning refutation of the very
pieces of evidence which he discloses to the State.
2
2
Under the Batson request rule, the defendant has no other alter-
native than to make a pretrial request for disclosure of informer
identity if he plans to use the informer as a defense witness. To
be successful the request must be accompanied by specific
grounds, e.g., the argument that the informer may corroborate
the defendant's alibi. Thus, a defendant who reveals a portion of
his defense in order to obtain informer identity, may be denied
disclosure, and evidence presented in the disclosure hearing can
be used against him at trial. Therefore, at the very least, the
Batson court should have acknowledged the possibility of incor-
porating a fair-exchange provision into its request rule. 23
19. 261 S.C. at 136, 198 S.E.2d at 521.
20. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
21. ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.875 (1953).
22. 412 U.S. at 476.
23. The Pritchett court, in discussing pretrial disclosure requests and possible four-
teenth amendment problems, said that:
Requiring a defendant who seeks disclosure before trial to indicate in some
detail his possible defense does not violate his constitutional right to remain
silent as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . Because
we do not require a defendant to say precisely what his defense is, the Common-
wealth does not necessarily acquire evidence that can be used against the defen-
dant, but if it does, the disclosure of the informant's identity works a fair
exchange.
312 A.2d at 439.
Of course one may argue that in Wardius the statute frequently and intentionally
required disclosure on an integral aspect of the defense-an alibi, while the South Carolina
request rule may do so only incidentally. The request for disclosure, as noted in Pritchett,
may be so indefinite as to be unusable by the prosecution. But it should be observed that
if a request that is likely to be granted is made, such a request runs the risk of exposing
1974]
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The Roviaro4 court had noted three limitations on the in-
former privilege. First, the contents of a communication are not
privileged when the disclosure will not reveal the informer's
identity. Second, the informer's identity is not privileged infor-
mation once it has been disclosed "to those who would have cause
to resent the communication." 5 Finally, fundamental fairness
requires "the disclosure of an informer's identity, or the contents
of his communication [where such a disclosure] is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair deter-
mination of a cause.
'2 6
Attempting to establish the Roviaro fundamental fairness
exception to the informer privilege, the defense argued that a
reasonable probability existed that the informer might be able to
give testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or inno-
cence. At the trial Batson had testified that one of the girls was
present earlier in the trial but had mysteriously disappeared be-
fore she could be subpoenaed or cross-examined. Furthermore,
the defense contended that the unidentified third girl, whose ex-
istence Gilreath denied, was riding with Gilreath when he first
arrived. Both Batson and McCrae testified that Batson was inti-
mately involved in the bedroom with one of the female informers
during the entire portion of the transaction which took place at
Batson's house. McCrae further testified that he believed the
substance he had sold was mescaline, rather than LSD as proven
by the State. In the first encounter each of the girls had paired
off with one of the boys and had attempted to purchase narcotics
from her companion. While McCrae had been living at the beach
for several months, Batson testified that he had only arrived the
day before his arrest. Additonal evidence indicated that it was
McCrae who had consented to the sale and had directed Gilreath
to the narcotics location, lending support to McCrae's testimony
that he had committed the offense and that Batson was an inno-
cent bystander. The informers might have corroborated McCrae's
version of the events by testifying with respect to Batson's reac-
meritorious defenses. Contra, United States v. Truesdale, 400 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1968), in
which the court found no fifth amendment violation when the trial judge ruled that he
would not require the informer's presence until evidence was presented to show his appear-
ance was necessary.
24. See note 3 supra.
25. Id. at 60.
26. Id. at 60-61. The drafters of rule 510 of the PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. avoided the
"judicial guessing game" by providing an in camera procedure to determine whether the
informer can actually supply testimony that would require disclosure of his identity.
[Vol. 26
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tion to the attempt to purchase narcotics from him, the kind of
narcotics McCrae had offered to sell, Batson's knowledge of the
contents of the plastic bag, the existence of the third girl, Bat-
son's whereabouts during the transactions at the house, whether
one of the girls had appeared earlier in the trial, and if she had,
why she was no longer available. In essence, the informers might
have contradicted Gilreath's testimony that Batson participated
fully in the narcotics sale.
2
1
In the face of the appellant's strong argument, the court said
that the appellant had no reason whatever to believe that he
would be benefited by any testimony from any other witness pres-
ent during the transactions. Although the court cited the balanc-
ing test from the majority opinion in Roviaro, its opinion more
closely resembles the dissent in that case. Advancing a trial strat-
egy theory, the Roviaro dissent stated that:
[A] casual reading of the record paints a picture of one vainly
engaging in trial tactics rather than searching for real defen-
ses-shadow boxing with the prosecution in a baseless attempt
to get a name that he already had but in reality hoping to get a
reversible error that was nowhere in sight.2
Echoing the Roviaro dissent, -the South Carolina Supreme Court
advanced its theory that the disclosure motion was mere trial
strategy divised to create doubt in the mind of the jury or, in the
event of conviction, to establish a basis for appeal. In support of
this theory, the court focused upon the appellant's failure to re-
quest a preliminary hearing, his failure to make any effort during
the fourth month period prior to trial to ascertain the informers'
identities and his failure to attempt to learn the identity of the
other male undercover agent when Gilreath indicated his willing-
ness to disclose it.2 9 Since Gilreath only knew the two girls by first
27. A case justifying informer disclosure when there is conflicting testimony is Com-
monwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973). See also note 18 supra.
For other cases involving fairly active informers comparable to the activity of the inform-
ers in Batson, see Lopez-Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968) (inform-
ant arranged meeting between custom agent and defendant-participated in negotia-
tions); Gilmore v. United States, 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958) (informer was an active
participant in setting stage, creating atmosphere of confidence by describing agent as
"seaman friend" and continuing that atmosphere through close presence during moments
of critical conversation).
28. 353 U.S. at 70.
29. In People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. App. 2d 753, 349 P.2d 964, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960),
the court confirmed that the trial court is entitled to consider the accused's delay in
presenting his motion as bearing on the strength or weakness of his claim that he needed
the evidence to prepare for trial.
1974]
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names, the court found it doubtful whether the informers could
be contacted even if Gilreath were compelled to disclose all the
information he knew about them." The court also found it doubt-
ful whether such contact could be made during the term in which
the case was being tried. Yet the evidence of the informer's early
appearance in court and Gilreath's testimony that he had known
one of the girls "a good while" suggests contact was not impossi-
ble. Fundamental fairness required that appellant be given the
opportunity to contact the informers.
Perhaps "the growing body of authority that the prosecutor
has an affirmative duty to disclose any evidence that could rea-
sonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense, and
which is material and capable of tending to clear the accused or
of substantially affecting punishment" 31 will strengthen the re-
quirements for disclosure on federal and state levels.
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself, it is not
yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always
to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in the
system, at least as far as "due process" is concerned, for [a
rule] which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the
criminal trial by ensuring both the defendant and the state
ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence.
32
II. ADVERSE INFERENCE FROM FAILURE TO CALL A WITNESS
During the 1973 term the South Carolina Supreme Court
faced the question of whether a trial court should have drawn an
adverse inference from the failure to call a witness in the cases of
State v. Batson,33 State v. Hicks,34 State v. Haulcomb, 5 and
Baker v. Port City Steel, Inc.36 The failure to call a particular
witness is conduct evidence.37 The party's action in failing to call
a witness is seen as an indication that he realized the witness'
30. People v. Diaz, 114 Cal. App. 2d 749, 345 P.2d 370 (1959) (the court found that
supplying the informer's name but refusing to furnish further identification did not meet
the state's duty to disclose the informer's identity).
31. W. LEDBETTER & W. MEYERS, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN SourH CAROLINA,48 (1971).
32. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
33. 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973).
34. 199 S.E.2d 304 (S.C. 1973).
35. 260 S.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 601 (1973).
36. 200 S.E.2d 681 (S.C. 1973).
37. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 265 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]; C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 272 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
[Vol. 26
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testimony would be unfavorable to his cause.38 Traditionally,
courts have determined whether the inference should be drawn by
examining "[w]hen it would be natural under the circumstances
for a party to call a particular witness. . ." and thereby introduce
favorable evidence. 39 In applying this test the courts have consid-
ered whether the evidence would have been material rather than
cumulative and whether the individual was "peculiarly avail-
able" to one party."
Determining whether a witness was "peculiarly available" to
a particular party is often an extremely difficult decision. Unlike
physical evidence which is far more likely to be within the exclu-
sive control of a specific party, a witness' identity, and therefore
his availability, is not often known solely by one party." If the
witness is equally available to both parties then no inference may
be involved. McCormick suggests that
[w]hat is in fact meant is that when so far as [it] appears the
witness would be as likely to be favorable to one party as the
other, there will be no inference .... At least it would appear
in this supposed case of "equal favor," if the witness's knowl-
edge is directed toward a particular issue, then the argument
should be available against the party who has the burden of
persuasion on that issue.
2
In civil cases the rule has been applied when the relationship
between the witness and the party failing to call him is that of
38. McCORMICK § 272.
39. Id. In civil cases the inferences can arise either from the party's failure to take
the stand or from his failure to call other witnesses. In criminal cases, however, no infer-
ence can arise from the failure of the defendant to take the stand. To allow such an
inference would violate the defendant's fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
40. McCORMICK § 272. The South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted this test and
has considered both criteria determinative.
In the absence of explanation, the failure or refusal of a party to produce evi-
dence may create an adverse inference where such evidence is within his knowl-
edge, and within his power to produce, is not equally accessible to his opponent,
and is such as he would naturally produce if it were favorable to him.
Davis v. Sparks, 235 S.C. 326, 333, 111 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1959), quoting 31 C.J.S. Evidence
§ 156a (1942).
Furthermore, as the court stated in Canady v. Martschink Beer Distributors the
inference may be drawn where the uncalled witness' testimony "was not merely cumula-
tive but would have been of material aid in resolving the conflicting inferences from the
testimony." 255 S.C. 119, 126, 177 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1970).
41. This is particularly true in civil cases because of the widespread availability of
discovery procedures. Additionally, if the existence of a witness is known to both parties
then he is subject to subpoena by either.
42. MCCORMICK § 272 (footnotes omitted).
1974]
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employee/employer, membership in the same family, or some
other relationship which results in some degree of control over the
witness. 3 In criminal cases, however, the courts have not estab-
lished clear rules. The question is complicated by the potential
existence of "a privilege against the witness's being called by the
adversary" or the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination.44
An adverse inference for failure to call a witness will not be
inferred if the party can justify the failure. A party is not required
to call every available person to give evidence in his behalf. 5 The
inference cannot be used to supply missing elements of proof, but
it is properly used to affect the credibility or probative force of
the evidence presented by the party against whom the inference
is drawn. 0 Although there exists an abundance of precedent for
the use of the adverse inference, courts are now applying the use
of the inference rule more cautiously in both civil and criminal
cases. 7 McCormick states that one factor dictating the need for
caution is that "[p]ossible conjecture or ambiguity of inference
is often present."48 The Supreme Court in Griffin v. California,"
noted that many considerations totally unrelated to guilt might
influence a party's decision to call a particular witness. The Court
stated that fear of impeachment, the particular mannerisms of
the individual, and the ability to undergo cross-examination
might all play a part in the decision." Further, it must be realized
that the claim that an uncalled witness' testimony would have
been material is also conjectural and can only be inferred from
43. Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 893 (1949). For South Carolina cases supporting this proposi-
tion, see Canady v. Martschink Beer Distributors, 255 S.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 475 (1970);
Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321 (1962); South Orange Trust Co. v.
Connor, 228 S.C. 218, 89 S.E.2d 372 (1955).
44. MCCORMICK §272.
45. E.g., 235 S.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 545 (1959); Ballard v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co.,
33 Wis. 2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967).
46. MCCORMICK §272.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
50. These tactical and personal considerations apply both to the decision to call a
particular witness and to the decision of the defendant to take the stand personally. In
addition
[t]he possibility that the inference may be drawn invites waste of time in
calling unnecessary witnesses or in presenting evidence to explain why they were
not called. Anticipating that the inference may be invoked entails substantial
possibilities of surprise.
McCoRMCK § 272.
[Vol. 26
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the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the adverse inference
should be
drawn only where, under all of the circumstances of the case, the
failure to produce such witness creates suspicion of a willful
attempt to withhold competent testimony."
The continued use of the adverse inference rule in both crimi-
nal and civil cases is open to criticism. The usefulness, of the rule
must be viewed in light of its effect on and propensity to serve
our system of justice. The procedural safeguards of the criminal
system are designed to maintain a fair state-individual balance."
The resources of the state are immense as compared with those
of the individual. In an effort to maintain a fair state-individual
balance, the entire burden of proof is placed on the state and its
proof must be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. Further,
the defendant is presumed to be innocent and is protected against
self-incrimination. On the other hand, in civil litigation the likeli-
hood of equality between the parties is much greater. The prepon-
derance of the evidence, a lesser standard of proof, is employed.
The adverse inference rule which "permits an inference of ques-
tionable factual validity based on a speculative assessment of
what an absent witness might have testified is perhaps justifiable
in the civil context . . ."I where the context is between private
individuals or entities. To allow the state the benefit of an ad-
verse inference from the defendant's failure to call a witness in
criminal proceedings, however, is inconsistent with maintaining
a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the
state. 4 Moreover, the nature of the inference rule does not lend
itself to the factual accuracy so necessary in criminal trials.
In State v. Batson,55 the South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's decision denying the defendant's request
to charge the jury that "where the State had witnesses known
only to it . . . and did not produce them, that their testimony
51. 235 S.C. at 334, 111 S.E.2d at 549. Support for this proposition is also found in
Jenkins v. Bierschenck, 333 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1964).
52. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
53. Comment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1422, 1438-39 (1973).
54. The potential effects of the inference rule would not fall equally on both the state
and the defendant. It could act to lessen the burden of proof placed on the state. The most
pernicious effect would be its potential to undercut the fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination.
55. 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973).
1974]
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would be presumed to be against the State."56 The court pointed
out that the State had given a "full and logical explanation" for
its failure to call the witnesses in question. Because the witnesses
were informers, the State had the privilege of refusing to disclose
their identities5 and therefore could refrain from calling them to
the witness stand. Herein lies one fault in the court's opinion. The
informer privilege is based upon the public policy of protecting
the flow of information necessary to aid effective law enforce-
ment. The Batson court based its decision for non-disclosure of
the informer's identity not on the informer privilege but on a
timely request rule.59 Consequently, the court's conclusion was
that a charge of adverse inference from the failure to call the
witness "would have served to defeat the entire purpose""0 of the
informer privilege. Even if the court had found the informer privi-
lege to be controlling in Batson and had concluded that the status
of the three informers required non-disclosure, a holding that an
adverse inference alone would entirely defeat the informer privi-
lege would have been to attach entirely too much weight to the
effect of the inference."1 The privilege extends only to the identity
of the individual; the communications of the individual are not
covered."2 A charge of an adverse inference would only declare
that the testimony of an undisclosed informer would have been
unfavorable to the state's case, and the inference would not reveal
the identity of the informer.
63
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Batson did suggest
that it might exercise greater caution in criminal cases than in
civil cases in allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from the
failure to call a witness. The court stated that:
56. Id. at 136, 198 S.E.2d at 521. The three uncalled witnesses were a SLED under-
cover agent and two informer-participants.
57. See generally PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 510. The privilege belongs to the govern-
ment or the state, rather than to the individual witness. Therefore, unless the state
exercises it the witness cannot hide his identity.
58. See note 2 supra.
59. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
60. 261 S.C. at 138, 195 S.E.2d at 522.
61. MCCORMICK § 77.
A privilege has its most substantial practical benefit when it enables a party to
exclude from the record a witness, document, or line of proof which is essential
to the adversary's case, lacking which he can not get to the jury at all on a vital
issue.
Id.
62. PROPOSED FED. R. EvW. 510 and Advisory Committee's Note, Subdivision (a).
63. By not revealing the identity of the informer, the specific protection of the privi-
lege would not be violated.
[Vol. 26
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[W]e entertain grave doubt as to the propriety, in a criminal
case, of the rule of adverse inference from the failure to produce
a material witness.
6 4
Because of the conjectural nature of the inference rule, extreme
caution is needed in the criminal area. Careful regulation of the
inference rule should add another link in the chain of procedural
safeguards maintaining a fair state-individual balance. Arguably,
the reasoning in the Batson decision does not aid in maintaining
that fair balance. For example, it can be argued that fundamental
fairness should have required that the appellant be given the
opportunity to contact the informers. Instead, the court adopted
a "timeliness requirement" to assure non-disclosure. In reaffirm-
ing the principle of Davis v. Sparks,5 the court overlooked a
factual situation that met the very criteria it cited.
The United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California6
ruled that a criminal defendant's fifth amendment rights are vio-
lated when either a comment or a charge of adverse inference is
made about his failure to take the witness stand. The courts,67
however, have not extended the "no comment" rule of the fifth
amendment to include comment on the defendant's failure to call
a witness. In practice, the interaction between the adverse infer-
ence rule and the fifth amendment "no comment" rule has
worked to erode the vitality of the latter."
In State v. Haulcomb,69 the court held that the defendant's
64. 261 S.C. at 138, 198 S.E.2d at 522.
65. 235 S.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 545 (1959); see note 8 supra. In Batson the inference
that might have been drawn from the government's failure to call a witness was favorable
to the defendant, and yet the witnesses were more likely to have been called by the State.
Another case in which a similar situation appeared is State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 183
A.2d 77 (1962).
66. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The essence of the Court's opinion is seen in the statement:
It is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tender-
ing to the jury for its consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No
formal offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's com-
ment and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and
its acceptance.
Id. at 613.
67. See, e.g., Lysczyk v. United States, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); United States v. Lyon,
397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); Kitchell v. United States,
354 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
68. The test formulated to determine the consitutionality of a prosecutor's comment,
the "naturally and necessarily" rule, has been so narrowly defined that few remarks have
been held inadmissible. In fact, in United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, the Court allowed
a prosecutor's remarks to stand because the possibility existed that the remarks might not
refer to the defendant. 418 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970).
69. 260 S.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 601 (1973). In Haulcomb the defendants had pleaded
the defense of entrapment to a charge of housebreaking and safecracking. 14
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request for an instruction to a jury concerning the inference rule
was not applicable. As the court stated:
At the outset, ... it becomes necessary to determine
which of the parties to the action should have called the witness
in order to determine who should bear the onus of the adverse
presumption.70
In a defense of entrapment, the defendants are the moving parties
and therefore they must bear the burden of proof; "[ilt was not
incumbent upon the State to prove the defense of entrapment."'"
In the ordinary criminal case the State must bear the burden
of proof, and therefore the same logic should apply to a request
by the State. To allow the State the benefit of an adverse infer-
ence is to lessen the burden of proof placed on it by the procedural
requirements of due process. This premise, however, seems to
have been overlooked by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In
State v. Hicks,72 the court stated that in a charge concerning an
adverse inference from a "party's" failure to call a witness (the
specific party being the State), the word "party" applies to the
State as well as the accused. 73 By qualifying the original charge,
it would appear that the court effectively negated any "onus"
placed on the State for failing to meet its burden of proof.
7
If the adverse inference is to have continued validity in crimi-
nal cases, then the use of such a charge must be limited in its
application. To allow the State the benefit of such inferences
lessens the burden of proof placed on it. The availability of such
a procedure upsets the fair state-individual balance that proce-
dural due process is designed to protect. Broad comments by the
State concerning a defendant's failure to produce witnesses
strongly suggest that the defendant must prove his innocence.
7
1
Restricting comments by the state, which concern a defendant's
70. 260 S.C. at 267, 195 S.E.2d at 604.
71. Id.
72. 199 S.E.2d 304 (1973). After complying with the defendant's request a jury charge
of an adverse inference from the the State's failure to call a witness, the court also upheld
the trial judge's qualification of that charge.
73. Id. at 307.
74. The logic contained in the Supreme Court's statement in Griffin v. California
reflects this fact:
What the jury may infer, given no help from the court is one thing. What it may
infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against
him is quite another.
380 U.S. at 614.
75. See United States v. Lambardozzi, 335 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U. S. 914 (1964).
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failure to produce specific witnesses, might eventually lead to
jury speculation about why a defendant failed to testify himself."
Perhaps, as one commentator suggests, a preferable solution
would be to eliminate the adverse inference in criminal cases and
to
extend the privilege against self-incrimination to bar all
remarks about a defendant's failure to produce witnesses, re-
gardless of whether the missing witness is the defendant'himself
or another."
In the civil context, the South Carolina Supreme Court dealt
with the adverse inference in Baker v. Port City Steel Erectors.75
At the close of the plaintiff's case, defendants rested their case
without introducing any evidence. Plaintiffs attorney requested
that the trial judge instruct the jury "that failure to produce a
material witness raises the presumption that testimony of that
witness would be adverse to the party failing to produce him."8
The supreme court framed the issue in terms of whether the
trial court was required to give the requested charge rather than
"whether, in weighing the evidence, an adverse inference may be
drawn by the jury from the failure of a party to testify or call a
material witness."81 The court thus addressed itself to the ques-
tion of whether a party's failure to call a witness creates a pre-
sumption that is mandatory or only a permissive inference that
the witness' testimony would have been unfavorable. 82 In uphold-
76. See United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1969).
77. Comment, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1422, 1434 (1973). The author discusses the develop-
ment of the adverse inference and relates it to the fifth amendment protections. The
author proposes the theory that comment on a defendant's failure to call any witness is
compelled evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. As such, the drawing of
an adverse inference is violative of the fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination as defined in Schmerber v. California, 383 U.S. 757 (1966) and Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); and restated in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
78. 200 S.E.2d 681 (S.C. 1973). The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action to col-
lect damages for her husband's death in a three vehicle collision. None of plaintiff's
witnesses who were involved in the accident could specifically testify how the accident
occurred. The driver and passenger of one vehicle were suffering from amnesia, the driver
of the second vehicle was the deceased, and the passenger in defendant's vehicle did not
see the accident. Record at 22, 109, 116, 237, 253.
79. Defendant's driver, John Henry Small, did not testify although he was seated in
the courtroom throughout the trial. 200 S.E.2d at 683.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Some courts say that a party's failure to call a witness creates a presumption;
the charge to the jury is usually phrased in terms of "may" rather than "must" and
1974]
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ing the trial court's refusal to issue the requested charge, the
court concluded that a party does not have a right to the charge.
The supreme court continues to use the words "presump-
tion" and "inference" interchangeably, and whichever term it
uses, its intention is the same. Unlike the usual presumption, the
one arising from failure to call a witness "is not directed to any
specific presumed fact or facts which are required or permitted
to be found."84 Citing an earlier decision,8s the court stated that
"[w]hen the presumption is drawn, it cannot be treated as inde-
pendent evidence of a fact otherwise unproved."8 Only when all
of the circumstances of the case warrant the suspicion that there
was a willful attempt to withhold evidence will a charge be given.
Further, even though the charge may be given, it is for the jury
to decide "whether the failure to produce the witness .. war-
rants the inference that it would be unfavorable.
'8
The charge requested by the plaintiff in Port City Steel was
erroneous in two respects. It did not explain the nature and effect
of the presumption which it requested. The court stated that "the
jury would be left to grope for the proper application of the pre-
sumption and might reasonably conclude that it could be given
the force of independent evidence."s In addition, the instruction
seemed to direct the jury to draw the inference. 9 In reaching its
decision the supreme court overruled a prior holding in Wilcox,
Ives & Co. v. Jeffcoat."0
"seemingly could at most be only a 'permissive,' not a mandatory presumption."
McCoimiCK § 272.
Most courts customarily speak of the party's conduct as creating an "inference."
Doubtless some of these courts would consider that the party has a right to have
such inference explained in the instructions, on proper request. Others no doubt
would say that the instruction is proper but not required. Still others would
condemn it as a comment on the evidence.
McCoRhfICK § 272.
83. See generally Comment, 14 S.C.L.Q. 538 (1962).
84. McCoRArncK § 272.
85. Collins v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 210 S.C. 207, 42 S.E.2d 67 (1947).
86. 200 S.E.2d at 683.
87. Id. at 684.
88. Id. at 683.
89. Id. at 684. For a discussion of the practical effect of jury charges, see note 74 supra
and accompanying text.
90. 135 S.C. 149, 133 S.E. 463 (1926). In Wilcox the charge requested stated that:
The failure or refusal of a party to produce evidence peculiarly within his knowl-
edge and control, which would have an important bearing upon the facts in
dispute, warrants the inference that it would be unfavorable to his contention.
Id. at 152, 133 S.E. at 464.
The supreme court held that the party requesting the adverse inference was entitled
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As a result of the decison in Port City Steel, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has brought this jurisdiction in line with the
growing trend toward exercising caution in allowing the use of
adverse inferences from the failure to call a witness.9" Justice
Littlejohn, in a concurring opinion, indicated that the inference
rule may have outlived its usefulness and that the court "should
consider upon proper petition the advisability of eliminating it as
a matter of common law.
' 92
III. LEARNED TREATISES
In Baker v. Port City Steel Erectors, Inc.13 the court dealt
with the use of a scientific textbook in the cross-examination of
an expert witness. The expert in this case was retained by the
plaintiff for the investigation and scientific reconstruction of the
accident which had been the cause of litigation. 4 During cross-
examination of the expert, it was established that he had used a
"conservation of energy" factor in his reconstruction. Defense
counsel then had the expert read, over plaintiff's objections, a
passage from a textbook that stated such a factor was unusable
in this connection. The expert then stated that there were other
treatises and formulas supporting his procedure.95 No other use
was made of the textbook in the trial.
On appeal to the supreme court, the plaintiff argued that the
use of the textbook constituted error, relying upon section 26-142
of the South Carolina Code of Laws" and the cases of Mitchell v.
Leech,97 Edwards v. Union Buffalo Mills Co.,9" and Baker v.
Southern Cotton Oil Co.99
The court stated that these decisions were not dispositive of
the issue at hand, commenting:
to the charge as a matter of right. Further, the court stated that it was an error for the
trial judge to have modified the charge "by leaving it to the jury to say whether or not
such failure warrants the inference that it would be unfavorable to his contention." Id.
91. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text.
92. 200 S.E.2d at 684. The justice stated that the rule often causes more problems
than it helps to solve in that it suggests to a juror that he may sepculate as to what an
available, but non-testifying witness would say. See also State v. Dent, 51 N.J. 428, 241
A.2d 833 (1968); Comment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1422, 1426-30 (1973).
93. 200 S.E.2d 681 (S.C. 1973).
94. Record at 133-34.
95. Id. at 191-93.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. §26-142 (1962).
97. 69 S.C. 413, 48 S.E. 290 (1904).
98. 162 S.C. 17, 159 S.E. 818 (1931).
99. 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931).
1974]
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In substance, these decisions hold that it is a violation of the
hearsay rule to use scientific treatises in the cross-examination
of an expert witness, where the effect is to permit the jury to
consider the treatise as direct proof of an issue in the case ....
The record clearly shows that the scientific textbook was
used in cross-examination of the expert solely for purposes of
testing the reliability of one of the factors used by him in analyz-
ing the accident and not as direct proof of any issue in the
case. "'00
The court then said that the text reference could not have been
used as evidence in the case at hand. It held that, under these
facts, the textbook's limited use for impeachment did not consti-
tute error.''
In 1883, the supreme court in State v. Coleman12 affirmed a
lower court decision to allow a medical text on insanity to be used
"for the purpose of framing proper questions, but not [in order]
to read what was said and then ask the witness whether'or not
he concurred in those views."'' 3 The supreme court went on to
remark: "We understand that an expert may be examined as to
how far standard works sustain or conflict with his opinion
"104
In 1891, the state legislature enacted a statute dealing di-
rectly with the issues in Coleman. Section 26-142 of the South
Carolina Code of Laws states:
100. 200 S.E.2d at 682-83. Professor Wigmore believed this objection to be both the
most generally employed and the only forceful one. Other rationales given by Wigmore
for the refusal to use learned treatises include: (1) scientific knowledge develops too
rapidly and texts may well be out of date, (2) the danger exists of confusing the jury
by technical language, (3) the texts may be used piecemeal and unfairly. In the case of
medical expertise, it has also been argued that such skill is dependant upon practice
rather than precedent; treatises represent, therefore, a secondary source of information at
best. Professor Wigmore dismisses these objections as either misleading or untrue.
6 WIoMoRE § 1690.
101. 200 S.E.2d at 683.
102. 20 S.C. 441 (1883).
103. 20 S.C. at 451. The court based its approval on the belief that such direct use of
the text could only result in leading questions. The lower court also allowed counsel when
"addressing the jury, . . . to read at pleasure from standard authors upon medical juris-
prudence their views upon insantity and the law applicable thereto. . . ." Id. This latter
ruling, however, was not challenged on appeal and thus the supreme court did not reach
this issue.
104. 20 S.C. at 451. This latter statement was made by way of dicta on the contempo-
rary state of the law. It is, however, difficult to see how the expert's concurrence or
disagreement with texts could be ascertained without some form of reading or direct
reference. The court may have intended the expert to be questioned only as to his position
relative to that of standard works in general.
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IN WHAT CASES MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC BOOKS MAY BE READ.-In
all actions or proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the ques-
tion of sanity or insanity or the administration of poison or any
other article destructive to life is involved and in which expert
testimony may be introducted, medical or scientific works, or
such parts thereof as may be relevant to the issues involved,
shall be competent and admissible to be read before the court
or jury, in addition to such expert testimony."' 5
It should be noted that this statute goes beyond Coleman in
allowing the works to be read in cases of this kind. Also, by
subsuming the issue in that case under statutory authority, it
tends to negate whatever force the rather liberal dicta quoted
might possess.
In 1904, the court in Mitchell v. Leach' was faced with the
exclusion of a medical text in a tort case. Defense counsel had
attempted to ask the expert witness if the text was a standard
work, intending to read an excerpt and ask whether it was an
authority. The supreme court found that the lower court "simply
ruled that you could not contradict or qualify the opinion of the
[expert] on the stand by showing what some author had said."'' 0
In this the court found no error. These cases follow the orthodox
rule in excluding such use of treatises in cross-examination. ' The
matters at issue in Mitchell do not, of course, fall under code
section 26-142 and the statute was not considered by the court in
its opinion.' 0
In 1931, the court considered the statute in Edwards v. Union
Buffalo Mills Co. 110 During cross-examination, counsel had asked
the expert witness whether a certain doctor was an authority and
proceeded to read a passage from a text by that doctor. When he
again tried to read from the text, the court, upon objection, ad-
vised counsel to ask "the direct question." Counsel read another
passage from the text and asked the expert whether he would
105. Act of December 16, 1891, Geni. L. No. 674, 1891 (20) 1042, codified as S.C. CODE
ANN. § 26-142 (1962).
106. 69 S.C. 413, 48 S.E. 290 (1904).
107. Id. at 422, 48 S.E. at 293.
108. McCoRMICK § 321; 6 WiGMORE § 1700(b).
109. Apparently, counsel for appellees did raise the statute in some manner, since it
is noted by the reporter for the South Carolina Reports in his list of authorities argued in
the brief.
110. 162 S.C. 17, 159 S.E. 818 (1931). This case was decided four days before Southern
Cotton Oil, although paginated later.
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agree."' Later, during his argument to the jury, counsel referred
to the text in question as supporting his position.1 2 The supreme
court was concerned that in no instance was the jury warned to
disregard the argument based on the excluded text.
The court said that to read such a text to the court or jury is
to make the author a witness without allowing opposing counsel
an opportunity to cross-examine, i.e., to violate the hearsay
rule."13 It went on to state:
The fact that the General Assembly found it necessary, by
a special enactment, to authorize the reading of medical or sci-
entific books, in cases [mentioned in the statute] . . ., is unan-
swerable proof of its intention that such books should not be
read to the Court, or jury, in other classes of cases."'
In other words, the legislature, by its enactment of code section
26-142, has recognized and sanctioned the general prohibition of
learned treatises as hearsay, except in those instances provided
by the statute. The court went on to state that "[s]uch books
may legitimately be used by counsel upon which to frame hypo-
thetical questions ....
In Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.," 8 defense counsel on
cross-examination read to the expert witness from a text. The
excerpt read and the questions asked dealt in no way with the
case at hand. Counsel maintained that his action was intended
to test the expert's medical knowledge, and the lower court over-
ruled the objection. Later, counsel asked the expert to read a
certain passage to the jury; the lower court told counsel to read
it himself in the interest of time."
7
The supreme court's opinion here is quite similar to that in
111. Record at 139-41.
112. Id. at 219-20.
113. 162 S.C. at 22, 159 S.E. at 819-20. In LaCount v. General Asbestos Rubber Co.,
184 S.C. 232, 192 S.E. 262 (1937), the court sanctioned the admission of medical articles
to impeach an expert, who had prepared them, under the prior inconsistent statement
rule. In line with its reasoning in both Edwards and Southern Cotton Oil, the court found
that the only legitimate reason for prohibiting the use of learned treatises was that such
use permitted the introduction of statements for an individual not available for cross-
examination. Since the witness was subject to cross-examination, his prior inconsistent
statements could be admitted. See generally EVIDENCE SURVEY, 25 S.C.L. REV. 378 381
(1973).
114. 162 S.C. at 22-23, 159 S.E. at 820.
115. Id. at 23, 159 S.E. at 820.
116. 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931).
117. Record at 115.
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Edwards. Considering the statute, the court stated:
If it were the law in South Carolina that medical books
could be read before the Court and jury, it would not have been
necessary for the Legislature, by special enactment, to provide
that such books might be read in two certain classes of cases.
The restriction of their use to such cases is irrefutable argument
that they cannot be used in any other cases."'
In its discussion of authorities, the court again noted that
"[tihe proper use of [learned treatises] is as a basis of hypothet-
ical questions." ' The court was particularly concerned over the
prejudicial effect that the excerpt used might have.
To permit this to be read was, as Prof. Wigmore says, to
make it evidence; evidence which does not correspond in any
particular with the history of the injury to Edward Baker, and
its effects, as disclosed by the evidence.'
Mitchell, Edwards and Southern Cotton Oil were character-
ized by the court in Port City Steel as prohibiting the use of
scientific treatises for cross-examination of experts "where the
effect is to permit the jury to consider the treatise as direct proof
of an issue in the case."1 21 Both Edwards and Southern Cotton
Oil, however, disallowed even the reading of such texts to the
court or jury. 22 The absolute form of this prohibition would seem
to cover a situation in which the expert witness is asked to read.
Edwards and Southern Cotton Oil did permit the use of such
texts "to frame hypothetical questioning;""12 it is, however, diffi-
cult to see what substantive use could have been made of a text
without some type of quotation allowed. Mitchell forbade an im-
peachment of the expert "by showing what some author had
said. 1 2 This language, like that of the two earlier cases, seems
to forbid a reading of scientific treatises during cross-
examination; it would appear to bar their use for cross-
118. 161 S.C. at 483, 159 S.E. at 823.
119. Id. at 486, 159 S.E. at 824.
120. Id.
121. 261 S.C. at 474, 200 S.E.2d at 682.
122. 162 S.C. at 22-23, 159 S.E. at 820; 161 S.C. at 483, 159 S.E. at 823.
123. 162 S.C. at 23, 159 S.E. at 820; 161 S.C. at 484, 159 S.E. at 823. Despite this
"hypothetical question" exception to the general prohibition, Southern Cotton Oil (and,
by implication, Edwards) has been interpreted as limiting any use of learned treatises to
those instances enumerated in code section 26-142. See DaHER at 11; Annot., S.C. CODE
ANN. § 26-142 (1962).
124. 69 S.C. at 422, 48 S.E. at 293 (emphasis added).
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examination in any way. Because Port City Steel involved both
an expert reading directly from a text and questions that were in
no way hypothetical, it is obvious that in fact this case represents
a substantial departure from precedent.
Edwards and Southern Cotton Oil based their prohibition
against reading treatises upon an interpretation of code section
26-142. Thus Port City Steel, by allowing some use to be made
of these treatises as evidence, leaves the meaning of this statute
in doubt. The court in Port City Steel noted plaintiff's argument,
which relied on the earlier interpretation of the statute, but
avoided any discussion of the issue. Since code section 26-142 is
still in effect, and its only interpretation derives from Edwards
and Southern Cotton Oil, we are faced with inconsistent authori-
ties. If confronted with this issue, the court will have to decide
whether to overrule its earlier cases and reinterpret section 26-
142, or overrule Port City Steel; we may probably assume that the
former procedure would be followed. One possible reason for this
confusion may be that plaintiff's attorney failed to meet the
court's technical requirement that a specific request be made to
overrule precedent. 2 ' In view also of language in the earlier cases,
characterizing the statute as a legislatively adopted exception to
a common law rule, the court may have been attempting to avoid
a conflict between its own rule-making power and that of the
General Assembly.
To recapitulate, the rule after Port City Steel can be stated
thusly: It is not a violation of the hearsay rule per se to use
learned treatises in the cross-examination of an expert witness.
The effect of such use cannot be such as to permit the jury to
consider a treatise as direct proof of an issue in the case. Given
the limitation of the holding to the facts of the case, we may add
the following inferences. Such an effect on the jury will not be
caused by a use of the treatise to examine a factor employed by
the expert in reaching his conclusion. There is apparently no
requirement that the expert be "familiar" with the text used, or
125. See State v. Bottoms, 260 S.C. 187, 197, 195 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1973), where the
court states:
We intimate no opinion as to the soundness of these [earlier] decisions, but in
the absence of being overruled, which we have not been asked to do, they are
dispositive of this particular issue. It is, however, we think of interest that the
rule applied in the cited cases has been most strongly criticized by Professor
Wigmore as being unsound.
As an example of possible statutory reintrepretation, see EVIDENCE SURVEv, 25 S.C.L. REv.
378, 381 (1973).
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that he need refer to it in his testimony as corroborating his
conclusion.'26 There is no real indication as to whether the mate-
rial must be established as an authority by the expert'27 or by
counsel.12 8 The text reference will probably be disallowed if it is
capable of being considered as evidence in the case.
These rules seem to allow for a use of treatises in the more
"abstract" areas of cross-examination; impeachment of the wit-
ness' status as an expert or the methods used by him to reach his
conclusion. They would seem to disallow any use for "concrete"
cross-examination dealing with the specifics of the case.
By its decision in Port City Steel, the supreme court has
brought South Carolina in line with the majority of other jurisdic-
tions.'2' It has answered Professor Dreher, who noted the absence
of the very distinctions made in Port City Steel.' 0 No doubt as
cases are appealed to the court, the ambiguities mentioned above
will begin to be clarified.
SUSAN D. TOLLISON
126. See generally MCCORMICK § 321; 6 WIGMORE § 1700(b). See also Reilly v.
Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
127. See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d at 94-98 (1958).
128. Id. at 98-104.
129. Id. at 77.
130. DREHER at 11.
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